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Abstract
Inter-clan conflicts wi thin orthem Israe l' s Arab community may pit dozens, hundreds,
sometimes th ousands of people agai nst each other in revenge and counter-revenge cycles
that can take years to resolve. Because disputants' clans often li ve in close proximity to
each other, third party interveners- Sulha (Settlement) Makers, mitigate against possible
revenge attacks, sometimes command the extended family of the perceived perpetrator to
leave their homes and move to another vi llage or town. This exile (tarhil in Arabic) often
impacts dozens of family members (mostly women and children), and can extend years,
sometimes decades. Such enforced exi le has a severe impact on the women (and other
members) of the exiled family. In exi le, such women and their families are tom away
from their organic living environment: they and their children are often transplanted into
an unwelcom ing new setting where they have to reconstruct life almost fro m scratch. Furthermore, these very same women are excluded from any form al participation in the resolution of such conflicts which almost always occur through the Sulha, an inter-intra clan,
customary justice app lication practiced, wi th variations, throughout the Muslim/Arab
world. This paper uses interviews literature, case studies, and analysis to locate and describe the ways in which inter-intra clan disputes impact women in orthem Israel's Arab community, and then locates and describes the informal yet influential cultural and
functional ways in which women impact the process and outcome of Sulha, during and
after the confl ict.

What is Sulha?
Sul ha (reconci liation in Arabic) is a 1,600-year old, prevalent dispute resolution
tradition, used primarily to facilitate inter and intra-clan (Hamula) 1 dispute management/resolution within clan-based Arab and Muslim cu ltures throughout the

Hamula is the Arabic word for a clan, a prevalent functi onal unit in tribal Arab cultures, consistof three to seven generations of one family related through the paternal line
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Middle East and other regions (Othman, 2007). Sulha is practiced not only
among Muslims, but also among and between Christian and Druze Arabs.
After a conflict erupts, the Sulha serves to facilitate the transformation of the
attitudes of the disputants ' clan (particularly the victim's clan) from a desire for
revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge-counter revenge
cycles), to a willingness to forgive (Jabbour, 1993; F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm.
June 14, 2009 2).
Whereas Western Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) diverged over the
years into several approaches, central among which are mediation and arbitration
(Barrett & Barrett, 2004; Abu-Nimer, 1996), Sulha employs a mix of mediation
and arbitration approaches used interchangeably throughout the process .
In addition to its unique mediation-arbitration approach, the practice of Sulha
informs our knowledge of Muslim and Middle Eastern conflict management in
other areas such as confidentiality, neutrality, and venting-all practiced within
the Sulha process in ways different from their practice in Western ADR (Pely,
2008).

The Patriarchal Context of Inter-Clan Dispute Resolution in
Israel's Arab Community
Israel's Arab community (Muslims, Christians and Druze) are part of Arab culture. Their customs, including customary justice practices such as the Sulha,
draw (with local variations) from the prevailing Arab culture of the Middle East
(Abu-Nimer, 1996).
The cultures of the Middle East and much of the Arab and Muslim world are
based primarily on patriarchal values and norms (Suad, 1996; Abu-Nimer, 1996).
Although there is scant, uncorroborated evidence of women playing a formal role
as mediators and in some instances in pre-Islamic Middle East (Smith, 1985),
today the Sulha employs-at least formally-a strictly male cast: third-party
interveners-a group of dignitaries who manage the Sulha process, who are
called the Sulha Committee (Jaha in Arabic) and disputants' representatives are
all males, and only males are allowed to act as witnesses in front of the Jaha. The
only formal access women have to the Jaha-and through it to the Sulha process-Is through their agnate 3 relatives (F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. June 14,
4
2009).
2

Mr. Farage Khneifes is Su/ha maker (member of the Su /ha Committee (Jaha) in the North of
Israel). Semi-structured interviews with author took place on the follow ing dates : July 24, 2007;
June 14, 2009; and July 15,20 11 , in Shefar' am, Israel. English transcri pt available.
3
Agnate is a relative whose relationship can be traced exclusively through males, (e.g., father,
brother, son) (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary).
4
Farage Kheifess changed hi s claim recently and is holding now that women are allowed to give
formal testimony in front of the Jaha, but the author was unable to corrobo rate th is claim.
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Women may be excluded from formal participation in dispute resolution in
the Middle East, yet disputes and their management and resolution impact their
lives in many ways: their husbands and sons become potential targets of revenge
ki llings; they (women and their families) are sometimes exiled from the conflict
region-to hel p reduce friction-resulting in economic, social and cultural dislocation for them and their families.
There is evidence that the Sulha is a successful process (Gellman & Vuinovich, 2008; Lang, 2002; F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm. June 14, 2009). Yet, formally
at least, the Sulha does not have any mechanism designed to accommodate the
concerns of women. This paper locates and identifies the exact instances and
mechanisms where women 's informal impact takes place, including pre-Sulha
maneuvering, the selection of Su1ha Committee members (Jaha), deliberations,
outcome (formal agreement) and post-reconciliation (lathat, 2007; F. Khneifess,
Pers. Comm . June 14, 2009; XXX, Pers. Comm. June 3, 2009\ informing our
knowledge of the interaction between formal and informal applications in traditional dispute management/resolution settings.
The term s "formal " and " informal" as used in this paper are researchergenerated, but are directly related to Jaha-associated definitions of "formal " and
·'informal" parts of the process . The term "formal" in the context of this paper,
therefore, denotes those aspects and stages of the Sulha process that are proscribed by its practitioners as necessary for the application to be considered complete and bind ing, culturally and within Sharia (Islamic law). This includes all
designated rituals, meetin gs and deliberations between the Jaha and the disputants' representati ves (e.g., the Sulha ceremony). Everything else is "informal"
(e.g., commun ication of women with individual Jaha members-not with the
Jaha as a form al body).

Relevant Literature
There is a significant amount of literature that examines various aspects of
the lives of Arab women in Israel , including the duality of subordination and
empowerment (Cohen & Savaya, 2003; Batrice, 2000; Ginat, 1982; LevyWe iner, 2003 ; Gorkin, 1996; Hasan, 2002; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, l999a, 2004;
halhoub-Kevorkian & Erez, 2002; Ahmed-Kasem, 2002; Kanaaneh , 2002;
Forte, 2001 ; Yahya-Younis, 2002; Abu-Baker, 2002; Erdreich & Rapoport, 2002;
Erdreich, 2003 ; Herzog, 2004). These studies use different approaches, from
omparison to Western feminist models, through cultural-relativistic approach, a
li nkage between fam ilial, community and state patriarchal agencies of oppres5 Because of a concern for the well being of some of people who agreed to discuss issues which are
currently considered taboo in Israel ' s Arab community (because they are perceived as challenges to
patriarchy) the author uses several devices to .preserve the anonymity of many of th e interviewees,
including the use of letters such as XXX and YYY to substitute for real names.
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sion, and highlighting women's "creative forms of resistance" (Sa' ar, 2006). Yet,
none of the above examines the interaction between women and traditional dispute resolution processes in general or the agency of Sulha in pa1ticular.
It may be that literature examining the place of women in Sulha is sparse
because literature examining Sulha in general is sparse and focuses mostly on
comparison between Sulha and Western ADR (Abu-Nimer, 1993; Irani, 1999;
Lang, 2002) or on other gender-related issues, such as "honor killings" (Hasan,
2002).
Elias J. Jabbour, a veteran Sulha practitioner from the town of Shefaamer in
Northern Israel, includes a chapter (Chapter 6) titled: "Women in the Culture of
Sulha: Arab Traditions and Values" in his book: Sulha-Palestinian Traditional
Peacemaking Process. The chapter focuses on the general place of women in
Arab culture. However, it does not contain a detailed exam ination and/or analysis
of the way Sulha impacts women and the ways women interact with Sulha and
impact it.

The Impact oflnter-Cian Conflict on Women
Disputes within Israel's Arab community, particularly blood disputes (those involving death or severe injury), have a significant impact on the immediate and
extended family of the perceived perpetrator. Inter-clan bonds and the traditions
of dispute management in this region decree that the male members of the victim's clan have a cultural obligation to restore the lost honor of their clan by
avenging the death/injury oftheir clan member (Jabbour, 1993; Ginat, 1987).6
Furthermore, the extended family of the perceived perpetrator (sometimes
more than one nuclear family), including dozens of women and children are
sometimes required to uproot en mass soon after the eruption of a conflict and go
into a temporary, extended or even permanent exile, away from the victim's fam7
ily (I. M'bada, 2011, Pers. Comm. Nov. 13).
The authority to order such an exile is in the hands of the Sulha Committee
(Jaha), a group of local and regional dignitaries entrusted in such cases with facilitating a reconciliation between (and within) disputing clans. They (the Jaha)
decide to instruct an exile if they have reason to believe that the continuing presence of the perpetrator's family in close proximity to the victim's clan may result
in attempted revenge attacks by members of the victim's clan against the member
of the perpetrator's clan (F, Khneifes, 2011 Pers. Comm. July 15). The authority
ofthe Jaha is informal, but it is rarely if at all rebuffed.

6

Jabbour uses the term "Circles of Responsibility;" Ginat uses the term "co-liable.''
Based on the author's semi-structured interview with Ibrahim M ' bada Naum (Abu M'bada),
Su/ha maker (member of the Su/ha Committee (Jaha) in the North of Israel). Interview took place
on ovember 13,2011, in Shefar ' am, Israel. Transcript available in English.
7
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In a clan-based rural culture, such as that of Northern Israel ' s Arabs, in many
cases, people live all their lives next to their kin group for generations, and lifelong social networks are a center of people's economic, social and religious lives.
Transplanting to a new environment represents, particularly for women, a major
life-change, including loss of social network, and loss of mobility and economic
well-being-since in many cases women are not allowed to leave the village to
work in unfam il iar settings without an agnate relative 's escort. This life change is
particularly significant for women, who shoulder a significant part of the burden
of caring for the fam ily' s children, elderly, health care, feeding, and many other
family and clan-related activities, and rely heavily on social network's suppot1
(Hertz-Lazarowitz & Shapira, 2005).

Impact of Conflict-Related Exile on Women 8-Case Studies
This section describes and analyzes two cases of extended family exile precipitated by inter-clan blood di sputes. The cases highlight the disruption caused by
the exile, as well as provide insight on the place of the exile in the resolution of
disputes.

Case Study 1
In September 1975, an inter-clan dispute erupted between two feuding clans
(Hamud and Rian) from the Arab v illage of Kabul in the North of Israel. The
dispute started when a member of the Hamud clan (Muslim Arabs) murdered
three members of the Rian clan (Muslim Arabs).
In an attempt to preempt revenge killings, the Sulha Committee ordered the
immediate ex ile of the killer' s extended family (about 40 people, mostly women
and children). T he family moved to the village of Kafar Manda, about 15 kilometers (I 0 miles) fro m Kabul. The exiled family lived in Kfar Manda for 33 years,
until the conflict between the two clans was resolved in 2008.
For 30 years, the Rian clan refused any attempts at mediation, and refused all
offers of temporary ceasefire. And indeed, in 2005, one of the murdered men 's
sons (Wallid Ri an, who was two years old when the di spute erupted and his father was killed), reta liated by killing the head of the Hamud clan (who was rumored to have been actively involved in the killing of the Riam men 30y years
earlier). Wallid was consequently sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, but his act
created a " balance" of sorts, which energized eff011s for inter-clan reconciliation
and a reconciliation agreement was reached in 2008.
Following the resolution of the conflict, and as part of the reconciliation
agreement, the exiled Hamud family was allowed to return to their home villages

The famil y" s children are also significantly impacted, but this is not the focus of this paper.
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and resume life across the street from the Rian clan. 9 Some of the Hamud famil
actually remained in Kafar Manda, having settled there over the 30-year exile
when they purchased land, started local businesses and even intermarried into
local families. 10
Farage Khneifess, a member of the Sulha Committee, who remembered the
this dispute in detail, stressed that as a rule, the Sulha Committee does not ever
force the exile of women and children; yet he conceded that " if men leave, women and children will follow as a matter of course, so the end result is the exile of
women and children as well as men ."
Forced exile, along with the rigidly enforced modesty codes that severely
limit the mobility and economic independence of women (Antoun, 1968) disrupt
essential mutual assistance links (women from neighboring and friend ly families)
and inter-family links between women relatives (mother, sister, aunt), 11 by reducing and limiting the number of people (women) that exiled women can interact
with and expect to receive assistance from. The resultant impact on the women of
the exiled family is probably more pronounced in the short term, w hen the impact
is economic and social. After all, a whole family finds itself, sometimes overnight, cast into a situation that requires them (mostly the famil y' s women) to
manage the family's affairs in a new, unfamiliar, sometimes even marginally
hostile location. Also, the fact that the exiled family's children usually stop going
to school, at least for a while (through a combination of administrative hurdles
and resultant exile-related trauma), increases the burden on the women of the
family, who are solely responsible for the care of children (F. K hneifes, 2011,
Pers. Comm. July 15). In the long run, it is reasonable to assume that the at least
some members of exiled families gradually integrate into the host community;
the children start going to school eventually (though it may take months), the
women create a new social network or integrate into existing ones in the new
location, and economically dislocated family members find new revenue generating sources in the new place, reducing the economic hardship (1. M'bada, Pers.
Comm. Nov. 13 (20 11); F. Khneifes, Pers. Comm . July 15 (20 11)).

Case Study 2
On July 20, 2007, the Sulha Committee instructed Rym Mousa, along with 70
family members, including 53 children under the age of 18, and nine women, to
leave their home village of Dir AI Asad, in the North of Israel. The order came
two days after two members of the Mousa clan were detained by police on suspi9

http ://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3532749,00.html (Hebrew)

°F, Khneifes, 20 II Pers. Comm. July 15.

1

11

Samira Haj (Haj , 1992) writes about women in Arab rural settlements that: '"Female relatives
such as mother, sister, and aunt continue to serve as a backup resource to share household tasks,
especially the care of preschool children ." This describes the situation in non-exile circumstances.
Of course, once part of the family moves away, such backup services are denied .
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cion of killing Amar AI lndi (age 35). Rym is the wife of one of eight male
members of the Mousa clan who were ordered into exile. Since then, the exiled
family has been living in rented accommodation in the nearby Arab town of
Sachnin and other villages in the area. 12
The forced exile resulted in the removal of several dozen children from their
schools. The kids remained at home with their mothers.
This case exemplifies the extended impact of the forced exile on the exiled
women. There is direct impact when these women are removed from their
homes; their daily routine is disrupted, as they are disconnected from the network
of family and friends that they lived with, and are cast into an isolated setting,
where they have little or no social contacts, and are sometimes looked upon as
"relatives of criminal s" (F. Khneifes, 2011, Pers. Comm. July 15). Those women,
some of whom, before the exile, worked outside their homes, helping with the
family's finances, lose their workplace in many cases because the increased distance prevents them from continuing to work.
It is no wonder, therefore, that women are resentful of the forced exile practice. Rym said in an interview with an Israeli newspaper: "We understand the
pain of the murdered man's mother. He's her only child. But why do we have to
pay for this by being exiled from our homes? I don't understand the logic of
this." 13
This is the first time that women came out publically, using a national media
platform (the country' s largest newspaper) to voice opposition to the practice of
forced exile. In the context of the strictly patriarchal practices of Israel's rural
Arab community, this is quite a daring and unusual move, and if it repeats itself
(women voicing public opposition to exile) it will require the attention of the
patriarchal leadership, both in the Arab communities and from the Sulha Committee.
Yet, measured against the threat of a retaliatory revenge attack by the victim's family, it is likely that the practice will continue, though, Sulha practitioners are said to "do their best to avoid sending families into exile" (F. Khneifes,
_Oil, Pers. Comm . July 15).
This conflict was resolved in July 20 ll; yet, according to the Sulha agreement, the exiled part of the Mousa clan must remain in exile in the town of
achnin until the summer of 2016, when they will be allowed to return to Dir AI
ssad.

n http://www. haaretz.co. illm isc/ 1. 1552170 (Hebrew).
'

3

http://www.haaretz.co.i llmisc/1. 1552170 (Hebrew)
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The Impact of Women on Inter-Clan Dispute Resolution (Sulha)
This section describes and analyzes the influence of women on the process of
Sulha, the customary path to inter-clan dispute resolution. An analysis of the
presence and influence of women within the Sulha process demonstrates that
despite the informal nature of the influence of women (on ly men are allowed to
formally participate in the Sulha process), the women ' s influence on the process
and its outcome is significant and material.

Women's Influence on Pre-Sulha Stages
Multiple interviews with women involved in Sulha situations provide evidence of
their involvement with Sulha as early as the pre-deliberation stages. The involvement takes place in several areas including:
I) Venting (mostly on the victim ' s family side)
2) Decision on the makeup of the Jaha
3) Agreement to stati the fonnal Sulha process, by agreeing to Atwa and
Hodna (a token of goodwill, and a ceasefire, conversely)
4) Financing the process

Venting
Venting is, apparently, a necessary condition to enable the victim ' s family to
subscribe to a non-violent attempt at dispute resolution- and women are the
main participants in this stage. Elias Jabbour writes about it (Jabbour, 1993: 47):
"Grief work, in many cases, must be enabled by the Jaha to make way for peace"
(page number).
Women from the victim ' s family get a chance to vent their (and their family's) anger, frustration and sense of humiliation, as part in thi s pre-Sulha stage.
This is the first contact between the victim's family and the dignitaries who represent what may later become the formal Sulha Committee (Jaha).
This is the only part of the Sulha where women ' s participation is recognized
(even somewhat encouraged).
After the offender's family representatives sign the Tafwith (authorization)
document, authorizing the initiation of the Sulha process, and requesting the Jaha
to contact the victim ' s side. The dignitaries approach for the first time the victim's family. They stand at the doorway and say, " We were sent and are authorized as Jaha by the killer' s family , and we invite you to consider us" (Jabbour,
1993). It is important to note that the Sulha makers are not using direct authority,
and in no way try to imply that they are instructing the vict im ' s family to join the
Sulha process. On the contrary, the Sulha makers mask their cultural authority,
and elevated social position under a nan·ative of uncommon politeness. This posture is designed to increase the victim ' s family confidence, enhance their sense of
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respect and control, reduce their sense of helplessness, and ultimately channel
them, with ample cultural support, away from the instinctive, and immediate urge
to avenge, and into the option of conciliation and ultimate forgivenesssomething that is almost unthinkable at this stage.
At this preliminary point, occasionally, the women and youngsters of the
victim' s family may be allowed to vent their frustration on the (male) dignitaries
of the Jaha by abusing them verbally, sometimes in quite an aggressive manner.
This is a behavior that goes well beyond all accepted norms in a strict patriarchal
environment in general, and in connection with the Sulha in particular. This extraordinary deviation from the norm provides the victim ' s family with a significant (and public) outlet for their rage, together with an acknowledgment of their
suffering, and sympathy with their need to recover their lost honor (Lang, 2002).

Determining the Jaha's Makeup
Deciding on the makeup of the Jaha is a process that includes ritualistic elements
and behind-the-scene negotiations and bargaining. At this stage of the Sulha, the
women ' s participation moves to the background, where it will stay for the duration of the process.
The Jaha draws its power and authority primarily from the status of its members within the community at large, and with the disputants ' families in particular. Also, as described above, the Jaha never acts without the explicit formal authorization of all the disputants. The role of the interveners is to navigate the
demanding transformative path of moving the disputants from pure desire to
avenge, to a non-belligerence stance, and finally to a formalized agreement to
forgive.
The makeup of the Jaha changes from case to case. The number of Jaha
members can be from one to "about 20" (Jabbour, 1993). The aspiration is to
avoid a top-heavy committee, but to include in it a number of members that refl ects the will of the disputants ' families, and may consequently be able (large
enough in number and significant enough in social standing) to leverage that
position to move the disputants toward a solution.
While the offender ' s and victim ' s families are not allowed to stipulate conditions for the operation of the Jaha, they have some input regarding its makeup.
For example, the disputants can veto the participation of individual Jaha memrs (F. Khneifess 2007, Pers. Comm. 24 July; M. Abu Saaluk 2007, Pers.
Comm. 12 July 14 ).
Women, at this stage, stay in their homes. Their husbands, brothers, and unles represent the entire famil y. They negotiate with the (temporary) Jaha, and
port to their respecti ve clan about the proposed makeup of the (permanent)

- Based on semi-structu red interview with Sheikh Mahmud Abu saaluk, a long-time Sulha Maker.
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Jaha. On occasion, a woman objects to a proposed Jaha member, because of past
conflicts, because she thinks that the particular person is negatively disposed
toward the family, hamula, or the family ' s religion (Jaha members tend to be
from more than one religious origin). If a woman succeeds in convincing her
male relatives of the need to exclude and/or include a specific Jaha member in
the group, they (the men) will return to the dignitaries and convey the point, either disclosing the women's objections or (more likely) presenting the objections
as their own . At this preliminary stage, the Jaha tends to accept such objections.
Sulha makers interviewed for this paper indicated that in many cases women
play an active role in determining the composition of the Jaha. "Without the tacit
agreement of women-folk, no Jaha will start operating," said one Sulha maker
(Anonymous, Pers. Comm. June 8, (2009),). There is an admission here of the
centrality of women to the process (despite their fonnal exclusion), and also of
the fact that both the community' s men-folk and the members of the Jaha recognize this centrality and accommodate it (though informally and anonymously).
We will see later, in the responses to the questionnaire, that both men and women
are quite aware of women's informal role in Sulha.

Entering the Hodna (Ceasefire Agreement)
Testimonies from Sulha makers indicate that in many cases, the women of the
victim's family argue forcefully with their male relatives to postpone agreement
to initiate a ceasefire agreement (Hodna). The women are said to do so in part for
emotional reasons when they feel unable to accept a formal-though temporary- abdication of right to avenge the dishonor and the loss of life (of a son or a
husband, in some cases). There is also a practical aspect to the pressure exerted
by the victim's family to postpone agreement to the initiation of a Hodna: it denies the offender the opportunity to appear in court, claim that a Sulha process is
ongoing, and that there is no further cause to hold him in detention . This is because Israeli law obliges the comt to examine substitutes to jail detention (e.g.,
house arrest), if it is possible to determine that the offender is not a danger to
himself or to other people. The initiation of a Hodna process can be used by a
defendant to argue persuasively in court that there is no cause for detention (Pely,
2008). While men tend to see this as part of the ongoing reconciliation process,
women are said (by men mostly, but also by some women) to have greater difficulty accepting the fact that the offender will not remain under lock and key for
the duration of his (state-initiated) trial and for the duration of the Sulha process
(Khneifess, Pers. Comm. July 24, (2007)).
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Financing the Atwa (Token of Good Will)
Sometimes, the men-folk of the offender' s family are temporarily or chronically
unemployed (unemployment in Israel ' s Arab sector is very high at approximately
40%). In such cases, it often falls to the women of the family to go out to bring
the funds requ ired for the Atwa (token of good will)-a payment by the offender' s famil y, des igned to symbolize an assumption of responsibility on their part,
and to ensure their cooperation with the Jaha ' s work and verdict (F. Khneifess
2009, Pers . Comm. 14 June; XXX 2009, Pers. Comm. 3 June 1\

Women's Influence on Sulha Deliberations
Throughout the deliberations of the Sulha Committee, women have no formal
access to it, and no formal influence on the process . Women, including mothers
and wives of victims or offenders, and of course female witnesses to the events,
are not eligible to testify formally in front of the Jaha, and are not allowed to
participate in the meetings with the Jaha, as members of the disputant's family
group.
Yet, women apparently participate in Sulha deliberations informally. In an
interview with Farage Khneifes, a Jaha member from the town of Shefaamer,
near Nazareth, Khneifess indicated that women are often involved indirectly:
"The male members go home, and come back to us the next day with a completely different idea or attitude, and we know that they had a discussion with their
wives, and are now actually representing them in the discussion." He added: "Of
course, a man would never admit that the idea is not his but his wife ' s, but we
can already di stingu ish between them" (F. Khneifess, Pers. Comm . June 14,
2009).
XXX, the mother of a perpetrator, said in an interview that she received no
information about the Sulha process from her husband (who was part of the family's delegation), but that she regularly contacted members of the Jaha, mostly at
night, and that she heard from them about the evolution of the process. A member of the Jaha that conducted the Sulha, in which the woman ' s son was involved, corroborated the evidence. He also indicated that this is not a unique
instance of informal contact between women-folk and members of the Jaha.
So it appears that in some cases women and Jaha members communicate
informally throughout the process-mostly when and where women press for
such communication.
Such input allows women to convey their attitudes and desires to the Jaha,
and even (as we shall see below) exert some influence over the process of the

15

XXX is the mother of a person considered (and jud ged in fo rmal court) to be res ponsi ble for the
"!l ing of another person. Therefore. she belongs to th e perpetrator' s clan.
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Sulha (through the Jaha member they are in contact with), without breaking any
taboos.

Women's Influence on Sulha Agreements
After hearing the disputants and consulting extensively with them, interviewing all the available witnesses (male only), and discussing the subject at length,
examining precedence, Sharia (Islamic law), and the unique aspects of the case
on hand, the Jaha finally nears the end of its deliberative stage. The end product
of the entire process is the Sulha Agreement, a concise and ritualistic document
that encapsulates tradition, reality, economics, emotions and, most of all, a view
to the future.
Women are formally excluded from participation in the composition of the
Sulha Agreement as well. But informally, it turns out from information gathered
from women, men and Jaha members, women make a significant contribution
into the crafting (and later also the execution) of the Sulha Agreement.
Fairouz Yassin from the village of Arabe, a university-educated accountant
(Muslim), and member of the board of the city of Acre Women's Association
Pedagogical Center, described a dispute she was familiar with, between two parts
of the same family. The dispute involved a cousin murdering his uncle during a
property-related argument. Since both families lived literally in the same building
(a recurring situation in israel's Arab community), the Jaha instructed the alleged
murderer's family to leave the village immediately and take up residence in another village.
Through male relatives, the widow of the victim conveyed to the Jaha that
she would not accept any Sulha Agreement that allowed the murderer's family to
return to the village--ever. Her argument was that the presence of the murderer 's
family in close proximity to hers would both remind her forever of her misfortune, and also serve as a constant irTitant to her children as they grew up, perhaps
even leading to an attempt at revenge.
The Jaha agreed (informally, of course, since doing so formally would erode
its position significantly), and instructed the murderer' s family to relocate permanently to another village (F. Yassin 2009, Pers. Comm. 5 June).
Here we have an indirect, yet significant influence of a woman on the
Sulha's resultant agreement. Although the Jaha did not hear the widow directly,
her representation by her male relatives was sufficient in this case. It is worth
noting that the widow's male relatives most probably supported her position.
Often, male relatives are reluctant to appear to be compromising their dominant
posture by allowing any input by women-folk, or "complicating" the pending
agreement. Had they not supported the woman 's position, there would have been
no reason for them to represent her conditions to the Jaha and to negotiate successfully for the acceptance of these conditions.
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Also, it is important to note that exile is a tool used sparingly by the Jaha,
and permanent exile is used even less often.
Farage Khneifes, a veteran Sulha maker, described a situation where the Jaha
initiated an indirect, and informal consultation with the widow of the victim, in
order, as he put it: "to make sure that her sons do not grow up feeding on her
resentment and hiring an assassin as soon as they are of an age and have the
money to do so" (F. Khneifess 2009, Pers. Comm. 14 June). In practice, what
took place, according to Khneifes, is that the Jaha consulted a male relative of the
widow regarding the evolving fonnat of the agreement. Only after the widow
reportedly gave her blessing to the tentative agreement, the Jaha proceeded to
make it final.

Women's Influence on Post-Sulha Inter/Intra Communal Reconciliation
Apart from the pre-Sulha venting stage, the only other stage where women have a
formally accepted role in Sulha is in the post-Sulha reconciliation stage. After a
Sulha Agreement and ceremony, it is time for the disputants' families to statt
reconstructing the fabric of cooperation and neighborliness that may have existed
before the dispute. This is a crucial element in the lives of many Arab communities, who live in crowded, sometimes isolated conditions, and must be able to
reconstruct their communal relations if they want to successfully cohabit following a dispute (F. Khneifess 2009, Pers. Comm. 14 June; Jabbour, 1993).
For women, the centers of their social network are their respective homes,
homes of female blood relatives (e.g. , sisters) who may sometimes be married
into the disputant's family, and the homes of other female relatives and friends,
who may be associated (through blood, friendship or marriage relations) with the
disputant' s family. Women are expected to use these social networks to establish
a healing process between the disputant families , first through small-scale meetings of female members, bringing their children along to start socializing again
with the "other side." Later on, such social interactions are expected to expand to
larger meetings, including men, at celebrations, ritual meals and other traditional
and family-related events (e.g., religious feasts, ceremonies to celebrate the birth
of a new family member).
There is an interesting paradox here between the insistence of many Sulha
makers that women act, almost always, as obstacles to reconciliation because of
their "emotional" attitudes, and their (the women ' s) desire to see the family of
the perpetrator suffer the consequences of the deed, and the reliance of the same
ulha makers (and the community at large) on women when it comes to reestablishing inter, and intra-hamuli relations following a Sulha Agreement. A
possible explanation is the need to reconcile patriarchal taboos with communal
realities. The "disruption" narrative supports the former, while the recruitment of
women for post-Sulha reconciliation reflects the later need .
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Conclusions
The case studies describing the post-dispute exile of extended families from their
homes demonstrated the negative impact of this process on families in general
and on the women of these families in particular. Such dislocations obviously
have a psychological, economic, and social impact on the effected women as well
as on the entire family group. Indeed, there are nascent signs of unwillingness by
women to silently accept such broad edicts. It is doubtful that opposition by
women to forced exile will bear fruit, but in a strict patriarchal society, even the
fact that women are voicing their opposition publicall/ 6 is significant. As we
have seen, Sulha makers are conscience of the disruption caused by exile and in
view of the public opposition to it by women, and may exercise more restraint
before imposing exile, though it is clear that the practice will not stop in the foreseeable future .
An examination of women ' s role within the Sulha ' s specific stages demonstrated that women ' s informal participation and influence extends throughout the
process, from the pre-Sulha stage of venting, through influence on the determination of the makeup of the Sulha Committee, to behind-the-scene involvement in
the deliberation, testimony giving stage, on through influencing the evolving
Sulha Agreement, and culminating with the important task of assisting the disputant families heal the rift, following the formal reconciliat ion and the Sulha ceremony.
This paper demonstrates that despite the fact that women are formally excluded from most parts of the Sulha dispute resolution process, they actually
participate in each part ofthe tradition informally but significantly.
This analysis informs both our specific understanding of the Sulha, and our
familiarity with possible interactions between formal and informal applications in
traditional dispute management/resolution settings. Furthermore, it sheds light on
an apparent gender-based " iceberg" characteristic of the Sulha, where the visible-men-only-part resides on top of a "sunken," invisible, unacknowledged
formally, yet active, integral and relevant, participation of women in the process.
Such insight may indicate that in the examination of traditiona l dispute resolution processes (particularly, but not only in strict patriarchal settings), their
outcome and post-resolution evolution, it may be relevant for the observer to
seek an understanding of the "invisible" (informal) impact of women, in addition
to locating and analyzing the formal, male-only segment of the practice.
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